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ABSTRACT
In January 2012 Mitt Romney’s campaign received a
cease-and-desist letter charging, among other things, that its use of
news footage concerning Newt Gingrich’s ethics problems in the House
of Representatives constituted a violation of NBC’s copyright. This is
just the latest such charge and came amidst similar allegations
against the Gingrich and Bachmann campaigns and in the wake of
similar allegations against both the McCain and Obama campaigns in
2008. Such allegations have plagued political campaigns as far back
as Reagan’s in 1984. The existing literature is nearly devoid of a
consideration of such uses as political speech protected by the First
Amendment. Rather, scholars tend to focus on fair use. Courts have
considered this question very rarely and also tend to concentrate on fair
use. Because these cases rarely progress to decisions, there is little to be
said of what courts have done but much to be said of what they ought
*
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to. This Article engages in a thought experiment of laying out the legal
analysis in the case that will never be—NBC v. Romney—arguing that
when copyrighted content is marshaled to advance a political message,
copyright ought to yield to the First Amendment.
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“Men speak of freedom of belief and freedom of property as if, in
the Constitution, the word ‘freedom,’ as used in these two cases, had the
same meaning. Because of that confusion, we are in constant danger of
giving to a man’s possessions the same dignity, the same status, as we
give to the man himself.”1
“First Amendment protections [are] embodied in the Copyright
Act’s distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable
facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment
traditionally afforded by fair use . . . .”2
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario: In connection with a campaign
for office, a politician airs an advertisement that uses a song.
Someone objects by way of a cease-and-desist letter, threatening to sue
the campaign. The campaign removes the advertisement from the
airwaves or ceases using the song.
Initially, this may seem like an unlikely scenario. After all, the
First Amendment implications of political speech and discussions of
political issues seem obvious.3 Nonetheless, similar scenarios have
played out in many political campaigns at all levels of government.4
One candidate for office even used the copyright in her website posts
to compel an opposing candidate to stop using her own words against
her.5 When First Amendment and copyright issues collide in the

1.

ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF
(1948).
2.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
3.
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
4.
See, e.g., Jack Doyle, I’m a Dole Man, 1996, THE POP HISTORY DIG (Dec. 3, 2009),
http://www.pophistorydig.com/?p=4891 (describing Bob Dole’s use of a version of “Soul Man” in
his 1996 presidential election campaign and the ensuing allegations of infringement); Jack
Doyle, I Won’t Back Down, 1989–2008, THE POP HISTORY DIG (Mar. 7, 2009),
http://www.pophistorydig.com/?p=932 (describing George W. Bush’s use of Tom Petty’s “I Won’t
Back Down” and Petty’s objections to same); Gary Graff, David Byrne Sues Florida Gov. Charlie
Crist for $1 Million, BILLBOARD (May 24, 2010, 2:31 PM), http://www.billboard.com/news/davidbyrne-sues-florida-gov-charlie-crist-1004093436.story#/news/david-byrne-sues-florida-govcharlie-crist-1004093436.story (describing copyright infringement lawsuit against Charlie Crist
for using the song “Road to Nowhere” in an ad during his campaign for Senate); Martin Lewis,
Chris Christie Rips off Monty Python, Troupe Threatens Suit, HUFF POST NEW YORK: THE BLOG
(Nov. 1, 2009, 6:17 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/martin-lewis/chris-christie-rips-offm_b_341598.html (describing accusations of copyright infringement against Chris Christie for
use of a Monty Python sketch in an ad during his campaign for Governor of New Jersey in 2010).
5.
See Eric Kleefeld, Angle Sends Cease-and-Desist to Reid -- For Reposting Her Own
Website, TALKING POINTS MEMO (July 5, 2010, 2:52 PM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/anglesends-cease-and-desist-to-reid-for-reposting-her-own-website.
THE PEOPLE 9
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context of campaign politics, high stakes and short timelines make
even untenable challenges possible.
During the Republican primary campaign leading up to the
2012 presidential election, copyright owners objected to the use of
content in at least seven different instances.6 The majority of these
objections concerned the use of sound recordings at campaign events.7
But one—the scenario that will be the focus of this Article—concerned
the use of a news report in a campaign ad.8 This Article focuses on the
use of news footage rather than songs because an ASCAP or BMI
license usually covers the songs used on the campaign trail.9
Therefore, protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, such uses
seldom implicate viable copyright infringement claims. Rather, artists
rely on the Lanham Act and the right of publicity to assert that use of
their songs at campaign events falsely implies some relationship
between the artist and the politician or the political message.10
Therefore, in order to address the copyright issues, this Article focuses
on a situation in which copyright was front and center—the dispute
between Mitt Romney and the National Broadcasting Company (NBC)
concerning the use of certain news footage.11

6.
See Katie Byrne, K’Naan Wants Mitt Romney to Stop Using Waving Flag, MTV
(Feb. 1, 2012, 7:50 PM), http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1678368/knaan-mitt-romney-wavingflag.jhtml (“Waving Flag”); Miriam Coleman, Newt Gingrich Ordered to Stop Using ‘How You
Like
Me
Now?’,
ROLLING
STONE
(Jan.
28,
2012,
1:30
PM),
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/newt-gingrich-ordered-to-stop-using-how-you-like-menow-20120128 (“How You Like Me Now?”); Andy Greene, Katrina and the Waves Join Tom
Petty’s Fight Against Michele Bachmann, ROLLING STONE (June 29, 2011, 3:50 PM),
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/katrina-and-the-waves-join-tom-pettys-fight-againstmichele-bachmann-20110629 ( “Walking on Sunshine”); Alleged Copyright Infringement and
Newt Gingrich: What’s All the Fuss?, DICKINSON LAW: IOWA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BLOG (Feb.
1,
2012),
http://www.dickinsonlaw.com/2012/02/allegedcopyright-infringement-and-newtgingrich-whats-all-the-fuss (“Eye of the Tiger”); Silversun Pickups Tell Romney to Stop Using
‘Panic
Switch’,
ROLLING
STONE
MUSIC
(Aug.
16,
2012,
9:50
AM),
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/silversun-pickups-tells-romney-to-stop-using-panicswitch-20120816 (“Panic Switch”); Tom Petty to Michele Bachmann: Stop Playing ‘American
Girl’, HUFFINGTON POST (June 28, 2011, 7:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2011/06/28/tom-petty-michele-bachmann_n_886384.html (“American Girl”).
7.
See sources cited supra note 6.
8.
See Tierney Sneed, Should Mitt Romney Withdraw His Tom Brokaw Ad?, U.S.
NEWS (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2012/01/30/should-mitt-romneywithdraw-his-tom-brokaw-ad.
9.
See Meredith Filak, Campaigns, Copyrights, and Compositions: A Politician's Guide
to Music on the Campaign Trail, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (July 6, 2011, updated July 7, 2011),
http://publicknowledge.org/blog/campaigns-copyrights-and-compositions-politic.
10.
See generally Sarah Schacter, Note, The Barracuda Lacuna: Music, Political
Campaigns, and the First Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 571, 587–97 (2011) (discussing the
endorsement aspects of a claim based on the use of music on the campaign trail).
11.
See infra notes 18–24 and accompanying text.
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In the middle of the fight of his life, his bid for the 2012
Republican presidential nomination, Mitt Romney ended up entangled
in a very different fight—the long-standing battle between copyright
and the First Amendment.12 Romney was not the only candidate
waging this two-front war; both Newt Gingrich and Michele
Bachmann also faced claims of copyright infringement.13 In fact,
while Romney14 and Bachmann capitulated to the demands that they
cease using certain copyrighted content,15 Gingrich was ultimately
sued.16 Like most suits that arise in this context, the Gingrich matter
settled quickly.17 The dispute between Romney and NBC provides an
interesting point of departure for a thought experiment about what
might happen if a court actually decided such a copyright
infringement suit on its merits.
On Friday, January 27, 2012, four days before the Republican
primary in Florida, the Romney campaign began running an ad there
entitled “History Lesson.”18 The thirty-second ad consisted solely of a
snippet of an NBC Nightly News report that originally aired on
January 21, 1997.19 The snippet in the ad showed Tom Brokaw
reporting on the end of Newt Gingrich’s career in the US House of
Representatives. Brokaw said:
Good evening. Newt Gingrich, who came to power, after all, preaching a higher standard
in American politics; a man who brought down another Speaker on ethics
accusations—tonight he has on his own record the judgment of his peers, Democrat and
Republican alike. By an overwhelming vote, they found him guilty of ethics violations;
they charged him a very large financial penalty; and they raised, several of them, raised
serious questions about his future effectiveness.20

12.
See generally Joseph P. Bauer, Copyright and the First Amendment: Comrades,
Combatants, or Uneasy Allies?, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 831 (2010) (describing the conflict
between the copyright regime and First Amendment principles).
13.
See sources cited supra note 6.
14.
See James C. McKinley, Jr., G.O.P. Candidates Are Told, Don’t Use the Verses, It’s
Not Your Song, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/04/arts/music/romneyand-gingrich-pull-songs-after-complaints.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
15.
See id.
16.
See Complaint, Rude Music, Inc. v. Newt 2012 Inc., No. 1:12-cv-00640 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
23, 2012).
17.
See Joy Lin, Gingrich Settling ‘Eye of the Tiger’ Lawsuit, FOXNEWS.COM POLITICS
BLOG (Aug. 24, 2012), http://politics.blogs.foxnews.com/2012/08/24/gingrich-settling-eye-tigerlawsuit.
18.
See Daily Mail Reporter, NBC Asks Romney to Stop Running Tom Brokaw Ad
Which Undermines Networks ‘Journalistic Credibility’, MAIL ONLINE (Jan. 28, 2012 11:34 PM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2093324/NBC-asks-Romney-stop-running-Tom-Brokawad-undermines-networks-journalistic-credibility.html [hereinafter NBC Asks Romney] (including
embedded video of the ad).
19.
See id.
20.
Id. (transcription of video ad).
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On Saturday, January 28, NBC voiced its objection to the
advertisement in a cease-and-desist letter claiming, among other
things, copyright infringement.21 Later that day, the campaign
claimed that its use of the content constituted fair use.22 Romney
himself responded to NBC’s claims on Monday, January 30, saying
that the campaign intended to discuss the matter with NBC’s
lawyers.23 Ultimately, the campaign withdrew the ad and removed it
from the campaign website.24
Such capitulation is the rule rather than the exception.25 As a
result, there is very little relevant case law considering the merits of
such cases.26 In lieu thereof, this Article considers how such a case
might be—and how it ought to be—resolved judicially.
All of the commentary occurring at the time “History Lesson”
aired concerned whether the Romney campaign’s use of the footage
constituted fair use under the Copyright Act.27 At first blush, this
may seem odd. After all, the First Amendment affords speech within
the context of a political campaign the highest degree of protection.28
However, given the United States Supreme Court’s prior treatment of
First Amendment assertions in the context of copyright suits,29 relying
upon the fair use doctrine makes sense.30 This Article asks whether
courts should reconsider the need for First Amendment scrutiny in

21.
See id.; see also Dylan Byers, NBC’s Letter to the Romney Campaign, POLITICO (Jan.
28, 2012, 4:02 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/media/2012/01/nbcs-letter-to-the-romneycampaign-112662.html (reproducing the letter).
22.
See NBC Asks Romney, supra note 18.
23.
See Michael Inbar, Romney: We’ll Meet With NBC About Brokaw Clip in Ad,
TODAY NEWS (Jan. 30, 2012, 9:26 AM), http://www.today.com/id/46188734/ns/todaytoday_news/t/romney-well-meet-nbc-about-brokaw-clip-ad/#.UT1q5tY3zdd.
24.
See Margaret Hartmann, Journalists Unhappy About Unauthorized Romney Ad
Cameo, N.Y.
MAG., http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2012/07/journalists-unhappy-aboutromney-ad-cameo.html (July 15, 2012, 11:37 PM).
25.
See Eriq Gardner, Michele Bahmann in Legal Spat for Using Tom Petty’s ‘American
Girl’ at Rally, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER: HOLLYWOOD, ESQ. (June 28, 2011, 11:48 AM),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/michele-bachmann-legal-spat-using-206257
(listing
copyright disputes in the context of political campaigns and noting instances of capitulation).
26.
In fact, only six decisions considering allegations of copyright infringement in the
context of a political campaign can be found. See infra Part IV.
27.
See, e.g., Ken Paulson, Copyright Law Favors Romney in Ad’s Use of NBC News
Report, FIRST AMENDMENT CTR. (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/copyrightlaw-favors-romney-in-ads-use-of-nbc-news-report; see also Ted Johnson, Fair Use? NBC Asks
Romney Campaign to Stop Using Footage in Ad, VARIETY (Jan. 28, 2012, 2:28 PM),
http://variety.com/2012/biz/opinion/fair-use-nbc-news-asks-romney-campaign-to-stop-usingfootage-in-ad-36896.
28.
See infra Part III.B.
29.
See infra notes 49–61 and accompanying text.
30.
See infra notes 49–61 and accompanying text.
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copyright infringement suits,31 at least in the limited context where
the alleged infringement takes place in the context of a political
campaign. In other words, can authors of copyrighted content grant or
refuse licenses to political campaigns based solely upon their own
ideological perspectives? If we believe that political discourse would
suffer if Fox News’s content is only available for Republicans and
MSNBC’s content is only available to Democrats, then the application
of First Amendment principles in this context must become more
robust.
The Article proceeds to imagine a judicial resolution to the
dispute between Mitt Romney and NBC. The intent of this exercise is
to provide an example illustrating the tension between copyright and
the First Amendment. Most courts have either ducked this tension or
held in favor of copyright interests.32 This Article demonstrates the
need for a more vigorous consideration of First Amendment principles
in these circumstances. Part II reviews the jurisprudence addressing
First Amendment claims in the copyright context. Part III considers
how the conflict between NBC and the Romney campaign might have
been resolved if approached from the perspective of the First
Amendment. Part IV presents an imagined resolution of the conflict if
approached from the perspective of copyright infringement and
considers whether the First Amendment interests at issue in such a
dispute are truly protected by the fair use defense and idea-expression
dichotomy. Ultimately, the Article concludes that—at least where the
alleged infringement occurs in the context of a political campaign—the
safeguards internal to the Copyright Act, as currently deployed, do not
fully protect the First Amendment interests at stake. Part V
endeavors to reconcile the Copyright Act with the First Amendment in
this context.
II. THE COPYRIGHT ACT–FIRST AMENDMENT INTERFACE: CAN THE
FIRST AMENDMENT BE CREDIBLY ASSERTED IN A COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT CASE?
“Concerning the First Amendment . . . some restriction on
expression is the inherent and intended effect of every grant of
copyright.”33 Scores of scholars have considered the potential conflict

31.
For another recent treatment of this topic, see Patrick Cronin, The Historical
Origins of the Conflict Between Copyright and the First Amendment, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 221
(2012).
32.
See infra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.
33.
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889 (2012).
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between the Copyright Act and the First Amendment.34
This
scholarly interest began in 1970 with seminal articles by Melville
Nimmer35 and Paul Goldstein.36 Nimmer argued that what he
referred to as the “definitional balance” achieved by the
idea-expression dichotomy largely mitigated the apparent conflict.37
Goldstein, tracing American copyright to its censorial roots,38
perceived a broader conflict and asserted the need for accommodation
principles taking into account the public interest39—a tack specifically
rejected by Nimmer.40 While Nimmer recognized some limited
instances in which the idea-expression dichotomy did not mitigate the
conflict between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act,41 the
accommodations he suggested were significantly more limited than
those suggested by Goldstein.42 This is hardly surprising given
Goldstein and Nimmer’s differing perceptions as to the breadth of the
conflict.
Courts that have considered conflicts between the First
Amendment and the Copyright Act have generally held that both the
idea-expression dichotomy and fair use operate to check any perceived
conflict.43 However, the vast majority of scholars, building on Nimmer
and Goldstein’s foundations, have argued that these internal
34.
See generally DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT (2009); NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL,
COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX (2008); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Lawrence Lessig,
Lecture, Copyright's First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057 (2001); Adrian Liu, Copyright as
Quasi-Public Property: Reinterpreting the Conflict Between Copyright and the First Amendment,
18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 383 (2008); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating
Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy
this Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J.
535, 546 (2004); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts
After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697 (2003).
35.
Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of
Free Speech and the Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970).
36.
Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970).
37.
Nimmer, supra note 35, at 1189–93.
38.
Goldstein, supra note 36, at 983.
39.
Id. at 988.
40.
Nimmer, supra note 35, at 1199.
41.
Id. at 1193–1200. Notably, one such instance perceived by Nimmer as problematic
was the use of news photographs. Id. at 1199. Nimmer defines news photographs as “all products
of the photographic and analogous processes, including motion picture film and video tape . . . if
the event depicted in the photograph, as distinguished from the fact that the photograph was
made, is the subject of news stories appearing in newspapers throughout the country.” Id. This
would appear to place all photographs and broadcasts of news carriers outside of the purview of
copyright. However, cases decided since Nimmer’s article make it clear that such is not the case.
See infra notes 156–161 and accompanying text.
42.
Nimmer, supra note 35, at 1200.
43.
See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
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mechanisms are insufficient to protect the inherent free speech
concerns; therefore, the Copyright Act ought to be subject to First
Amendment scrutiny.44 For example, one scholar recently argued
that, where the derivative works right is at issue, the Copyright Act is
susceptible to a First Amendment challenge based upon overbreadth
and vagueness.45 Another has asserted that the First Amendment
cannot aid in resolving copyright disputes because there are First
Amendment values on both sides in any copyright infringement suit.46
This Article seeks to bring some of these theoretical forays
down to earth. It reflects upon a situation in which a political
campaign used copyrighted content without obtaining the copyright
owner’s permission. Although such disputes arise every campaign
season, because the campaigns (the alleged infringers) tend to concede
to the demands of copyright owners, commentators are unlikely to
have definitive case law upon which to rely any time soon.47 This
Article attempts to fill the void left in the absence of such cases and, in
so doing, to demonstrate that the current approach to these issues
results in chilling important political speech.
In a sense, it is not at all surprising that the Romney campaign
ceased running the “History Lesson” ad in the face of NBC’s
objections. NBC’s cease-and-desist letter came a mere ten days after
the Supreme Court’s decision in Golan v. Holder.48 The Golan Court
held that the Uruguay Round Agreement Act,49 which restored
copyright protection to various works of foreign authors, did not
require heightened First Amendment scrutiny.50 In so holding, the
Court merely extended the approach it took in Eldred v. Ashcroft in
which it considered whether the Copyright Term Extension Act51
(CTEA) ran afoul of the First Amendment.52 The CTEA extended the
term of all existing copyrights by twenty years,53 and the Court held
that no heightened First Amendment scrutiny was required because

44.
See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality,
112 YALE L.J. 1 (2002).
45.
Christina Bohannan, Taming the Derivative Works Right: A Modest Proposal for
Reducing Overbreadth and Vagueness in Copyright, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH L. 669 (2010).
46.
David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 U.
PITT. L. REV. 281 (2004).
47.
See infra Part IV.
48.
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
49.
Codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A.
50.
See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878.
51.
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998).
52.
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–21 (2003).
53.
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act § 102.

506

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 16:3:497

the law did not affect “the traditional contours of copyright.”54 The
Golan Court later defined the term “traditional contours” of copyright
as limited to the idea-expression dichotomy and the affirmative
defense of fair use.55 In both Golan and Eldred, the Court rejected
facial First Amendment challenges to Copyright Act revisions.56 One
potential area for First Amendment consideration, then, may be an
as-applied challenge.
The last time the Court considered an as-applied First
Amendment challenge to the Copyright Act was Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.57 In Harper & Row, Nation
Enterprises answered Harper & Row’s copyright infringement claim
by asserting that its use of President Ford’s memoir was privileged
under the First Amendment.58
Specifically, Nation Enterprises
argued that the freedom of press guaranteed by the First Amendment
protected its use of the newsworthy content.59
Rejecting this
argument, the Court stated: “In our haste to disseminate news it
should not be forgotten that the Framers intended copyright itself to
be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to
the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive
to create and disseminate ideas.”60
In the wake of Harper & Row, lower courts have consistently
rejected the First Amendment as a defense to a copyright
infringement claim.61 Although the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit issued a decision finding that that the
issuance of an injunction in a copyright infringement suit constituted
a prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment,62 the court
ultimately vacated its decision, replacing it with one focused on the
fair use defense.63 While there are no decisions directly addressing
the issue of whether the use of copyrighted content in the context of a
54.
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
55.
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890.
56.
See id. at 878; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218.
57.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 541–42 (1985).
58.
See id. at 555 (“Respondents, however, contend that First Amendment values
require a different rule under the circumstances of this case.”).
59.
See Brief for Respondents at 43, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539 (1985) (No. 83-1632), 1984 WL 565761, at *43.
60.
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558.
61.
See, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1982); Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[T]he First Amendment does not
shield copyright infringement.”); Chi. Sch. Reform Bd, of Trs. v. Substance, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d
919, 925 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Lish v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1105 (S.D.N.Y.
1992).
62.
See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165, 1166 (11th Cir.),
vacated by 268 F.3d 1257 (2001).
63.
See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1276 (11th Cir. 2001).
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political campaign is protected by the First Amendment, the
hesitation of courts to consider First Amendment arguments in the
context of copyright infringement suits would counsel litigants to
proceed on the basis of fair use. In fact, all of the decisions about
copyright infringement in the context of political campaigns progress
along these lines.64
It is important to note that defendants in copyright
infringement suits face steep consequences. A finding of copyright
infringement can result in the issuance of an injunction65 and the
imposition of statutory damages that may far exceed any actual
damages suffered by the copyright owner.66 Courts have avoided
considering a First Amendment defense in the copyright infringement
context by applying the Supreme Court’s holding in eBay v.
MercExchange,67 which requires an equitable four-factor analysis to
determine whether the issuance of an injunction is appropriate.68
Prior to eBay, once a copyright holder demonstrated infringement,
courts presumed the likelihood of irreparable harm and, therefore, the
issuance of injunctive relief was generally a foregone conclusion.69 It
has been suggested that refusing to enjoin copyright infringement in
some instances will serve to protect First Amendment interests.70
While applying eBay to make the issuance of injunctive relief
less likely may help alleviate some First Amendment concerns, merely
focusing on injunctive relief cannot fully address those concerns when
the specter of damages of up to $150,000 per infringement looms. In
addition, the Copyright Act provides that the prevailing party may
also recover attorney’s fees and costs.71 This Article asserts that when
the alleged infringement occurs in the context of a political campaign,
the freedom of speech interests are so acute that resorting to the fair
use doctrine or the idea-expression dichotomy is insufficient. Rather,
courts should either approach the question from the First Amendment
perspective or, at the very least, better incorporate First Amendment
principles into the fair use analysis.
This Article will now consider the hypothetical case NBC v.
Romney from the perspective of the First Amendment followed by an
analysis under the Copyright Act. This side-by-side analysis calls into
64.
See infra notes 184–194, 214–223 and accompanying text.
65.
See 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2012).
66.
See id. § 504.
67.
See eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
68.
See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 2010).
69.
See, e.g., id. at 75–76 (explaining the Second Circuit’s approach prior to eBay).
70.
See Mark A. Lemley and Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 182 (1998).
71.
17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012).
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question the assertion that Copyright’s internal safeguards—namely,
the idea-expression dichotomy and the affirmative defense of fair
use—are sufficient to protect First Amendment interests.
III. CONSIDERING NBC V. ROMNEY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
As the Court made clear, “political speech [is] at the core of
what the First Amendment is designed to protect.”72
Before
undertaking the substantive analysis of the fictional suit between
Romney and NBC, it is important to note some points of First
Amendment law. As an initial matter, the fact that the suit in
question would occur between private litigants does not preclude First
Amendment analysis.73 While there must be some state action in
order for the First Amendment to apply,74 the enforcement of the
Copyright Act constitutes such state action.75 Courts have entertained
First Amendment arguments in defamation cases,76 right of publicity
cases,77 and trademark cases.78 Moreover, in copyright cases that
raised First Amendment arguments, no court refused to hear such
arguments because of a lack of state action.79
Further, any assertion that the nature of copyright, being a
private property interest, precludes First Amendment inquiry is
untenable. First, the idea that copyright is, in fact, property is very
much in dispute.80
Moreover, First Amendment jurisprudence
provides any number of instances in which the asserted property

72.
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003).
73.
See The N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
74.
See id. at 265.
75.
See id. (“Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts
have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their
constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that that law has been applied in a
civil action and that it is common law only, though supplemented by statute. . . . The test is not
the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has
in fact been exercised.” (internal citations omitted)).
76.
See id. at 266.
77.
See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988).
78.
See, e.g., S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 535
(1987).
79.
See supra notes 49–65 and accompanying text.
80.
See WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 109–20 (2009)
(explaining that the main difference between tangible property and copyrights arises from ex
ante physical limitations on rights in the former and expansive, abstract ex post rights in the
latter).
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interests of one party necessarily cede to the First Amendment rights
of another.81
Having addressed these preliminary matters, this Article turns
now to a consideration of whether the Romney campaign’s use of the
content in question ought to be privileged under the First
Amendment.
A. The Copyright Act, as Applied to the Use of Content in the Context of
Political Campaigns, is Arguably Unconstitutionally Vague
Some scholars have recently noted that the Copyright Act may
be unconstitutionally vague.82 While one vein of this scholarship is
limited to “the broad swath of copyright law in which the derivative
works right intersects with the fair use doctrine,”83 the other sets out a
general vagueness problem in the Copyright Act.84 That said, both
recognize the problematically vague nature of the fair use defense,85
and both agree that it is unlikely that a court will find the Copyright
Act, as a whole, void for vagueness.86
A statute is unconstitutionally vague when “men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.”87 A vague statute may run afoul of the First Amendment
if it prohibits protected expression.88 In addition, reliance upon an
affirmative defense to rescue an unconstitutional statute is
necessarily problematic under the First Amendment.89
Political speech is not only protected expression; it receives the
maximum protection under the First Amendment.90 While some
courts have held that the First Amendment does not give an
individual the right to copy another’s speech,91 no court has yet
considered the potential vagueness of the fair use defense as it applies
to the use of copyrighted content in the context of a campaign for
81.
See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, The Dale Problem: Property and Speech Under
the Regulatory State, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1541, 1548 (2008) (collecting and analyzing cases).
82.
See Bradley E. Abruzzi, Copyright and the Vagueness Doctrine, 45 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 351, 366 (2012); Bohannan, supra note 45, at 683.
83.
Bohannan, supra note 45, at 672.
84.
See Abruzzi, supra note 82, at 372.
85.
See Bohannan, supra note 45, at 681–88; Abruzzi, supra note 82, at 377–81.
86.
See Bohannan, supra note 45, at 692–94; Abruzzi, supra note 82, at 387.
87.
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (citing Int’l Harvester Co.
v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 (1914); Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 638 (1914)).
88.
See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 33 U.S. 507, 509 (1948).
89.
See Bohannan, supra note 45, at 681–82.
90.
See supra notes 76–89 and accompanying text; infra notes 96–105 and
accompanying text.
91.
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
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political office. Examining the dispute between Romney and NBC
may provide a road map for a litigant advancing a vagueness
argument in this context.
As noted previously, all of the contemporaneous commentary
about the Romney-NBC dispute concerned application of the fair use
doctrine.92 While many commentators saw a clear case for fair use,93
one expert opined that Romney’s fair use argument was anything but
clear.94 This demonstrates that even the experts disagree over the
application of the fair use doctrine in this context. Moreover, it is
clear that Romney’s advertisement is “speech uttered during a
campaign for political office” and, as such, is entitled to the highest
degree of protection under the First Amendment.95
Further
consideration of the jurisprudence laying out the protection afforded
campaign speech demonstrates that requiring Romney to engage in
the fact-intensive project of proving that his use is a permissible fair
use would run afoul of the First Amendment.
B. Campaign Speech Has Long Enjoyed Special Protection Under the
First Amendment
The Supreme Court has long held that the First Amendment
provides the greatest protection to speech concerning governmental
affairs.96 In fact, in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central
Committee, the Court stated: “[T]he First Amendment ‘has its fullest
and most urgent application’ to speech uttered during a campaign for
political office.”97
Such speech is deemed necessary for
98
self-government.
According to the Court, “debate on the

92.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
93.
See e.g., Paulson, supra note 27; Seth Abramovitch, Is Romney's Tom Brokaw Ad
‘Fair Use?’, THE WIRE (Jan. 29, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.thewire.com/
politics/2012/01/romney-nbc-ad-fair-use/48013.
94.
See Geri Haight, Copyright Lessons from the Campaign Trail: Romney, Gingrich
and Fair Use, MINTZ LEVIN: COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK MATTERS (Jan. 30, 2012),
http://www.copyrighttrademarkmatters.com/2012/01/30/copyright-lessons-from-the-campaigntrail-romney-and-fair-use.
95.
See William A. Williams, A Necessary Compromise: Protecting Electoral Integrity
Through the Regulation of False Campaign Speech, 52 S.D. L. REV. 321, 349 (2007); infra notes
96–105 and accompanying text.
96.
See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“[T]here is practically universal
agreement that a major purpose of . . . [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion
of governmental affairs.”).
97.
Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (quoting
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).
98.
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 160 (1983) (“‘[S]peech concerning public affairs is
more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.’” (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1965)) (alteration in original)).
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qualifications of candidates [is] integral to the operation of the system
of government established by our Constitution.”99 Courts consistently
hold restrictions on advertisements concerning both political issues
and candidates unconstitutional under strict scrutiny.100
The
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission bears this out.101
In Citizens United, the Court
specifically held that “political speech must prevail over law that
would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence.”102 Although
Citizens United deals with a very different statute, much of the
language of the decision is arguably directly applicable to suits arising
under the Copyright Act. For example:
The First Amendment does not permit laws that force speakers to retain a[n] . . .
attorney . . . or seek declaratory rulings before discussing the most salient political
issues of our day. . . . The Government may not render a ban on political speech
constitutional by carving out a limited exemption . . . .103

The Citizens United Court “decline[d] to adopt an
interpretation that require[d] intricate case-by-case determinations to
verify whether political speech is banned.”104 The Court also pointed
out that the very need for lawsuits commenced in the “heat of political
campaigns” to determine whether certain speech is acceptable
“stifle[s]” political speech.105
The advertisement at issue in our fictional suit between NBC
and Romney certainly concerns governmental affairs. It is speech
concerning the qualifications of a candidate for public office. As such,
it ought to be accorded the highest degree of protection under the First
Amendment.106 Under current case law, Romney’s best option for
escaping liability in a copyright infringement action would be a
successful assertion of the fair use defense.107 But, such an approach
would necessitate a case-by-case determination.108 The Supreme

99.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
100.
See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n, v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007).
101.
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).
102.
Id.
103.
Id. at 324.
104.
Id. at 329.
105.
Id. at 334.
106.
See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (“The vitality of civil and
political institutions in our society depends on free discussion. As Chief Justice Hughes wrote in
De Jonge v. Oregon, it is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that government
remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected. The right to speak
freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions
that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes.” (internal citation omitted)).
107.
See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
108.
See COPYRIGHT LITIGATION HANDBOOK § 13:22 (2d ed. 2013)
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Court in Citizens United specifically stated that requiring such
determinations in the heat of a campaign is impermissible under the
First Amendment.109 As such, it seems clear that if the fictional case
NBC v. Romney were approached from the perspective of the First
Amendment, NBC would be unable to obtain injunctive relief.110 This,
of course, leaves open the question of whether NBC ought to be
entitled to damages.
C. Allowing Any Remedy in these Circumstances Would Infringe the
Constitutionally Protected Freedom to Listen
Allegations of copyright infringement when the copyrighted
content is used in the context of a political campaign not only
implicate the First Amendment rights of the speaker but also offends
those of the intended audience—the voting citizenry. It has long been
recognized that First Amendment protections extend to the right of all
of us to hear the exchange of information.111 In other words,
“[s]ociety’s interests in enjoying a transparent debate and in receiving
information . . . are paramount and are protected in conjunction with
the speaker’s interest in self-expression.”112 This right is particularly
salient when the expression in dispute constitutes political speech.113
The very notion of self-government requires an informed electorate.114
Forcing a politician to pull an advertisement deprives the
voting public of the politician’s intended message. While some might
argue that the Romney campaign could have simply recounted the
facts stated in the NBC report, the question really is whether it ought
to be required to do so.115 The value in reproducing the NBC content
109.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 333–34 (2010).
110.
See id.; Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson., 283 U.S. 697, 737 (1931) (holding
that enjoining protected speech is prohibited under the First Amendment); see also Lemley &
Volokh, supra note 70, at 205 (regarding the sufficiency of damages in copyright infringement
cases).
111.
See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (“The exigencies of the
colonial period and the efforts to secure freedom from oppressive administration developed a
broadened conception of these liberties as adequate to supply the public need for information and
education with respect to the significant issues of the times.”); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
564 (1969) (“It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive
information and ideas. ‘This freedom (of speech and press) . . . necessarily protects the right to
receive . . . .’” (quoting Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943))).
112.
Peter J. Ferrara & Carlos S. Ramirez, The Constitutional Freedom to Listen, 6
LIBERTY U. L. REV 1, 5 (2011).
113.
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
114.
See id.; Ferrara & Ramirez, supra note 112, at 6–7.
115.
See Randy Picker, Politics, Copyright and the First-Amendment Commons, THE
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL FACULTY BLOG (Feb. 21, 2012, 9:07 PM),
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2012/02/politics-copyright-and-the-first-amendmentcommons.html.
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is more than merely recounting the asserted facts. The reproduction
of the news report adds a stamp of objectivity to the facts. If the
Romney campaign can use the footage, the voting public receives both
the facts and the information that a respected news agency reported
those facts. If news agencies as copyright owners can stop politicians
from engaging in such uses, they can deprive voters of information
relevant to the credibility and impact of statements. The message of
the Romney campaign as embodied in its use of NBC’s footage may be
useful; indeed, respected news outlets reported on Gingrich’s ethics
problems. The Romney campaign would assert that those problems
are relevant to voters’ consideration of Gingrich as a candidate. The
most salient means to convey the totality of that message is to
reproduce the content of respected news agency. Utilizing the First
Amendment as the appropriate frame for this question allows
consideration of the interests of listeners, the voting public, as well as
the political speakers.
Having considered the First Amendment arguments Romney
might assert in a potential suit over his use of NBC’s footage, this
analysis moves on to consider whether the First Amendment rights of
NBC might be implicated.
D. Anticipating the First Amendment Offense: The Right Not to
Speak, Compelled Speech, and Expressive Association
Faced with a First Amendment defense to a copyright
infringement suit, copyright owners have asserted a countervailing
First Amendment interest in stopping the alleged infringement.116
Succinctly, the argument is that a failure to enjoin the alleged
infringement constitutes a usurpation of the copyright owner’s right
not to speak.117 This line of argument has some basis in the case law.
In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court considered whether The
Nation’s use of short excerpts from the memoirs of President Ford to
scoop an article constituted fair use.118 Concluding that the use was
not a fair use, the Court stated, “[F]reedom of thought and expression
‘includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from

116.
See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 2010).
117.
See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 50, Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010)
(No. 09-2878-cv), 2009 WL 6865323, at *50 (“Salinger’s constitutionally based right not to
publish derivatives is not the type of injury that can adequately be remedied by monetary
damages; it is exactly the kind of damage that courts traditionally find irreparable. Indeed, this
Court has reversed a lower court for failing to issue a preliminary injunction in a case involving
the right not to speak, citing the many cases to that effect.” (citing Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v.
Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1996))).
118.
See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560–69 (1985).
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speaking at all.’”119 For this proposition, the Court relied upon Wooley
v. Maynard, in which a New Hampshire statute requiring the display
of the state motto “Live Free or Die” was held to infringe upon
Maynard’s right not to speak.120 In Harper & Row the Court went on
to say, “Courts and commentators have recognized that copyright, and
the right of first publication in particular, serve this countervailing
First Amendment value.”121
More recently, in Salinger v. Colting the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit stated, “The plaintiff’s interest is,
principally, a property interest in the copyrighted material . . .
[b]ut . . . a copyright holder might also have a First Amendment
interest in not speaking.”122 Salinger dealt with whether the trial
court erred in issuing an injunction against the publication of 60 Years
Later: Coming Through the Rye, a novel by Frederik Colting.123
Colting’s novel purported to tell the story of J.D. Salinger’s famous
character, Holden Caulfield, sixty years after the events that occurred
in The Catcher in the Rye.124 The Second Circuit considered whether
the Plaintiff’s right not to speak might be implicated where the
Defendant wrote an allegedly infringing sequel to the Plaintiff’s
copyrighted work.
The allegedly infringing work did not copy
Salinger’s novel.
Rather, Salinger alleged that Colting’s novel
constituted an unauthorized sequel to The Catcher in the Rye.125 The
plaintiffs asserted that publication of Colting’s novel would cause
irreparable harm by infringing upon their right not to speak.126
Although the Second Circuit remanded the case for consideration of
the issue of irreparable harm, the Court explained that “infringement
of the right not to speak, ‘for even minimal periods of time,
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’”127
Although Harper & Row and Salinger relied nearly exclusively
on Wooley as the conceptual basis for a copyright owner’s First
Amendment right, Wooley is in a line of Supreme Court precedent that
requires some exegesis to fully understand the ill-fit of the right not to
speak and related concepts in the context of copyright infringement
119.
Id. at 559 (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)).
120.
See 430 U.S. at 717.
121.
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560 (citing Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102 (1981)).
122.
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S.
(8 Pet.) 591, 661 (1834); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559
(1985)).
123.
Salinger, 607 F.3d at 74–75.
124.
Id. at 71.
125.
See id. at 72.
126.
See id. at 81.
127.
Id. (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)).
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suits.128 The Court has broadly described the right not to speak:
“[G]overnment may not force individuals to utter or convey messages
they disagree with or, indeed, to say anything at all.”129 This right is
said to be protective of “a speaker[’s] . . . autonomy to choose the
content of his own message.”130
The right not to speak is broad enough to prohibit the
government from requiring an individual to convey the government’s
message and from requiring an individual to convey a third party’s
message.131 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission
of California demonstrated the latter. The Court held that an order of
the California Public Utilities Commission requiring the plaintiff to
include a newsletter published by another entity in its customer
billing mailings infringed upon the company’s First Amendment
rights.132 Specifically the Court stated:
The Commission’s order forces appellant to disseminate . . . speech in envelopes that
appellant owns and that bear appellant’s return address. Such forced association with
potentially hostile views burdens the expression of [different] views . . . and risks forcing
appellant to speak where it would prefer to remain silent.133

As such, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. might be placed in the line
of expressive association cases that stands for the proposition that the
First Amendment prohibits the government from requiring
organizations to include certain messages in their expressive
conduct.134
The vast majority of expressive association cases arise from
scenarios like the following: An individual seeks inclusion in an
organization on the basis of some anti-discrimination statute. The
organization responds by asserting that such inclusion abridges its
expressive association rights by requiring it to convey a message it
does not wish to.135

128.
See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61
(2006); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995);
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 32 (1986); PruneYard Shopping
Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 99 (1980); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256
(1974) W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943).
129.
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 573 (2005).
130.
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573.
131.
See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 573.
132.
See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 20–21.
133.
Id. at 18.
134.
For an explication of the concept of expressive association, see, for example, Dale
Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale: A Tripartite
Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1534–35 (2001).
135.
See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 615 (1984).
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Neither the right not to speak—at issue in Wooley and Pacific
Gas & Electric Co.—nor the right of expressive association is a perfect
fit for the assertion made by copyright holders. As an initial matter,
the foundation of all of these is that the speaker should not be forced
to convey a message with which he or she does not agree.136 In
copyright infringement cases such as the NBC v. Romney
hypothetical, NBC is not forced to say anything; rather, its words are
merely copied.137 Moreover, while the right of expressive association
may superficially appear to have some relevance, it is important to
note that those cases consider the validity of the application of some
statute to require one speaker to include the message of another in its
speech.138 Here, NBC seeks to exclude its speech from Romney’s
campaign advertisements.
There is simply no reading of the
expressive association cases that grants NBC this degree of control
over the content of Romney’s message.
Even if one believes that these concepts have some relevance in
copyright infringement suits, it is important to recall that the decision
in Harper & Row, which read the right not to speak into copyright
jurisprudence, was based, at least in part, on the right of first
publication.139 Undergirding the right not to speak was a privacy
interest that had previously inhered in common law copyright holders
prior to publication.140 In his seminal article, Nimmer aptly notes that
cases in which the content in question has already been published
implicate no such privacy interest.141
It is difficult to comprehend how publication of Colting’s novel
could be perceived as a compulsion of speech by Salinger analogous to
the government compulsion to express a particular viewpoint
considered in Wooley.142 It is also clear that the facts presented in
Salinger were markedly different from those in Harper & Row. In
Salinger, the alleged infringement was the writing and publication of
a sequel rather than the copying and scooping of an important portion
of a text prepublication, as was the case in Harper & Row.
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit found that the dispute over
136.
See supra notes 130–133 and accompanying text.
137.
For a philosophical argument that all copyright infringement constitutes compelled
speech in derogation of the copyright owner’s autonomy, see Abraham Drassinower, Copyright
Infringement as Compelled Speech, in NEW FRONTIERS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (Annabelle Lever ed., 2012).
138.
See supra notes 130–135 and accompanying text.
139.
See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
140.
See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 34 (1986)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
141.
See Nimmer, supra note 35, at 1191.
142.
See Deidré A. Keller, Recognizing the Derivative Works Right as a Moral Right: A
Case Comparison and Proposal, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 511, 536–38 (2013).
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publication of 60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye implicated the
right not to speak.143 That decision was inconsistent with both the
First Amendment jurisprudence underlying the right not to speak and
the case extending that concept into copyright.
In a suit between Romney and NBC over the Romney
campaign’s use of NBC’s footage, basing a finding for NBC on the
right not to speak would be tantamount to saying that NBC has the
right not to speak in certain contexts or the right not to have its
speech associated with a particular candidate or party. NBC, in its
televised broadcast, had already spoken. The only remaining question
is whether NBC should be able to stop the Romney campaign from
repeating that speech to further its political objectives. Does NBC
have the right to control the content of Romney’s political message
through the assertion of its copyright? In a sense, answering this
question requires consideration of whether we privilege NBC’s
copyright or Romney’s right to convey his political message in the
manner of his choosing. In other words, a satisfactory answer
requires us to squarely address the issues that arise when the
proprietary interests of copyright meet the free speech interests
embodied in the First Amendment.
IV. THE COPYRIGHT APPROACH TO NBC V. ROMNEY: DO THE INTERNAL
SAFEGUARDS PROTECT THE FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS?
Courts have consistently held that First Amendment scrutiny
in the context of copyright infringement suits is unnecessary.144
143.
See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2010).
144.
See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758–59 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979) (“[D]efendants’ [First Amendment] claim can be dismissed
without a lengthy discussion . . . .”); Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls. v. Princeton Review, Inc., 332 F.
Supp. 2d 11, 20 (D.D.C. 2004) (“The First Amendment does not require that copyrighted works
be published or made available to particular persons.” (citing Stewart, 495 U.S. 207, 228–29
(1990))); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 321, 346–47
(D.N.J. 2002) (rejecting the Defendant’s First Amendment argument holding, “[c]opyright laws
are thus not restrictions on speech, as ‘copyright laws, of course, protect only the form of
expression and not the ideas expressed.’” (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
726 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring))); Lish v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090,
1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that the idea-expression dichotomy and fair use are sufficient to
protect any First Amendment interests not fully alleviated by the ability to quote purely factual
information); Consumer Union of the U.S., Inc. v. The New Regina Corp., 664 F. Supp. 753, 761
n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (rejecting Defendant’s First Amendment argument stating “[t]he
idea/expression dichotomy embodied in copyright ‘strike[s] a definitional balance between
the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while
still protecting an author's expression.’” (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985))); United States v. Bodin, 375 F. Supp. 1265, 1267–68 (W.D.
Okla. 1974) (“We fail to see as any protected first amendment right a privilege to usurp the
benefits [of the copyright holder’s efforts].”).
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According to the Supreme Court, “copyright’s idea/expression
dichotomy ‘strike[s] a definitional balance between the First
Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication
of facts while still protecting an author’s expression.’”145 The D.C.
Circuit later stated, “copyrights are categorically immune from
challenges under the First Amendment.”146 While the Supreme Court
has articulated a more nuanced approach,147 its recent decision in
Golan seems to support the notion that the application of the First
Amendment in the context of copyright cases is only appropriate when
the idea-expression dichotomy and fair use fail to protect the free
speech interests.148 Therefore, any assertion that a court ought to
approach a copyright suit from the perspective of the First
Amendment must begin with a consideration of the viability of these
internal safeguards.
A. Idea-Expression Dichotomy: Considering the Copyrightability of
News and Infringement by Reproduction
The first aspect of copyright law asserted as protective of First
Amendment interests is the idea-expression dichotomy.149
The
idea-expression dichotomy began as a judge-made principle.150 In
1880, the case Baker v. Selden151 introduced the concept to American
law.152
Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act codified the ideaexpression dichotomy, stating: “In no case does copyright protection
for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
or embodied in such work.”153 The inclusion of the word “discovery” in

145.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S 539, 556 (1985) (quoting
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d, 471
U.S. 539 (1985)).
146.
Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff’d, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
147.
See Eldred v. Reno, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (“We recognize that the D.C. Circuit
spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights ‘categorically immune from challenges under
the First Amendment.’” (quoting Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d at 375)).
148.
See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012) (describing the traditional contours
of copyright as the idea-expression dichotomy and the fair use defense and noting that the Tenth
Circuit’s broader reading of the term was incorrect).
149.
See id.
150.
See Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN.
L. REV. 321, 325 (1989).
151.
101 U.S. 99 (1880).
152.
See Samuels, supra note 150, at 326 (“The idea-expression dichotomy in America is
said to have originated in the United States Supreme Court case of Baker v. Selden.”).
153.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
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the statute demonstrates that copyright does not extend to the facts
contained in an otherwise copyrightable work.154
It has long been held that the facts conveyed in a news report
are “publici juris; . . . the history of the day.”155 In International News
Service v. Associated Press,156 the Supreme Court said:
It is not to be supposed that the framers of the Constitution, when they empowered
Congress “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries” (Const., art. I, § 8, par. 8), intended to confer upon one who might happen to
be the first to report a historic event the exclusive right for any period to spread the
knowledge of it.157

However, the form of the news report is copyrightable.158 This is true
whether the news is in the form of an article159 or a television
broadcast.160
It is important to note that, while courts often hail the
idea-expression dichotomy as one of the safeguards that protect First
Amendment interests, in cases raising the First Amendment as a
defense to infringement courts tend to disregard the concept almost
entirely and rely instead on the fair use defense.161 If the alleged
infringing content is an exact reproduction of the copyrighted content,
the idea-expression dichotomy can only mitigate a finding of
infringement if the merger doctrine applies.162 The merger doctrine
154.
See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.11
(Matthew Bender, rev. ed.). Another way of articulating the same concept, that facts are not
copyrightable, is by making reference to the Copyright Act’s definition of copyrightable subject
matter as “original works of authorship.” See 17 U.S.C § 102(a) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Feist
Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991) (finding that a white pages
directory was not copyrightable because it merely reproduced existing facts in an unoriginal
manner, that is in alphabetical order). This article addresses this concept by way of reference to
the idea-expression dichotomy because courts routinely make reference to the dichotomy as one
of the two internal safeguards for First Amendment concerns. Id. at 350.
155.
Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918) (emphasis added).
156.
Id.
157.
Id.
158.
See Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95–96 (2d Cir.
1977).
159.
See id. at 95.
160.
See, e.g., Ga. TV Co. v. TV News Clips, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 939, 946 (N.D. Ga. 1989)
(“[C]opyright protection attaches to the broadcast feature only when the first copy of the
transmission is made.”).
161.
See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 (2001);
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 83 (2010). Note also, that none of the decisions in which a claim
of copyright infringement is asserted in the context of a political campaign includes any
discussion of the idea expression dichotomy. See infra notes 184–194, 214–223 and
accompanying text.
162.
See, e.g., Scott Abrahamson, Seen One, Seen Them All? Making Sense of the
Copyright Merger Doctrine, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1126–27 (1998).
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applies when there are so few possible forms of expression for a
particular idea that the idea and expression merge.163
Some
commentators and courts have questioned whether the merger
doctrine ought to apply to visual works at all.164
Many academics have considered whether the idea-expression
dichotomy functions to advance First Amendment interests.165 But
would the idea-expression dichotomy allow the Romney campaign to
use the content in question in this fictional case? The foregoing brief
review of idea-expression jurisprudence demonstrates that the answer
to that inquiry is, simply, no. As an initial matter, the content in
question, though based upon facts, is copyrightable.166
The
idea-expression dichotomy cannot assist in the infringement analysis
because Romney used an exact reproduction of the copyrighted
content, and the merger doctrine, which has not yet allowed the
copying of a television news broadcast, is unlikely to be helpful.
Some might argue that even if the idea-expression dichotomy is
unlikely to serve as a defense after the fact, it ought to have been
instructive to the Romney campaign beforehand.
That is, the
idea-expression dichotomy delineated what the campaign could
do—utilize the facts reported in NBC’s broadcast—and what it could
not do—reproduce, distribute, or display the broadcast itself.
However, whether Romney could have gotten around the potential
copyright problem is not at issue here; the question is whether the
Copyright Act should operate to require him to do so. Once the
campaign chooses to utilize the footage, should NBC have the ability
to use its copyright to enjoin the campaign from doing so or recover
damages for that use? If we believe that speech undertaken in the
context of political campaigns is deserving of the greatest degree of
freedom then the answer to this question must be no. In order to
determine whether a court approaching this issue would arrive at that
answer, we must consider the merits of the infringement analysis.
B. The Infringement Analysis
Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants the exclusive rights of
reproduction, distribution, and public display, among others, to the
163.
See id. at 1126.
164.
See Michael D. Murray, Copyright, Originality, and the End of Scènes à Faire and
Merger Doctrines for Visual Works, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 779, 787, 858 (2006) (“[T]here are myriad
possible ways to express ideas visually . . . .”).
165.
See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression
Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work’s “Total Concept and Feel,” 38 EMORY L.J. 393, 396–97
(1989).
166.
See supra Part IV.A.
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copyright owner.167 One need not copy the entire copyrighted work to
be liable for infringement.168 In fact, there is no bright line rule as to
what portion of a copyrighted work an alleged infringer must
reproduce to result in a finding of infringement.169 Rather, courts
consider both quantitative and qualitative taking; that is what portion
of the content was taken and how important the portion copied was,
relative to the remainder of the work.170
There is no question that the Romney campaign reproduced a
portion of the NBC broadcast without its authorization. Although the
advertisement only utilized thirty seconds of the broadcast, because
there is no definitive amount of content which must be taken in order
for there to be a finding of infringement, it is entirely possible that the
advertisement in question would be found to infringe NBC’s exclusive
rights.
C. Fair Use
Fair use, like the idea-expression dichotomy, is a common law
principle.171 Folsom v. Marsh was the first US case to apply the
principle.172 The 1976 Act first codified fair use in the statute.173
Section 107 of the statute reads:
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright. In
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the
factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;

167.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
168.
See, e.g., Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 463 F.
Supp. 902, 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
169.
See Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74–77 (2d Cir. 1997)
(explaining the concept of de minimis taking in the context of copyright infringement and
ultimately holding that the appearance of some portion of Plaintiff’s poster in a total of less than
thirty seconds of the television show in question was not a de minimis taking); see also
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801–02 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that
the sampling of two seconds of a song constituted actionable infringement); Fisher v. Dees, 794
F.2d 432, 434 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[A] taking is considered de minimis only if it is so meager and
fragmentary that the average audience would not recognize the appropriation.” (citing Elsemere
Music, Inc. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1980))). For a recent analysis of
the development of the de minimis doctrine, see Peter S. Menell and Ben Depoorter, Using Fee
Shifting to Promote Fair Use and Fair Licensing, 102 CAL. L. REV. 53, 63–64 (2014).
170.
Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 797–98.
171.
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 n.27 (1984)
(describing the history of the fair use doctrine in American case law).
172.
9 F. Cas. 342, 345, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
173.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).

522

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 16:3:497

(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.174

Although the listed factors are nonexhaustive, they tend to
predominate courts’ fair use decisions.175 Fair use is an affirmative
defense.176 Moreover, fair use is a mixed question of law and fact,177
which requires case-by-case analysis.178 Given the fact-sensitive
nature of the fair use inquiry, courts have long held that summary
adjudication of fair use is improper.179
1. The Purpose and Character of the Use
To determine whether this factor favors the copyright owner or
the alleged infringer, courts often consider (1) whether the use is
commercial or for nonprofit or educational purposes180 and (2) whether
the use is transformative.181 The nonprofit nature of the alleged
infringement is not dispositive.182
Courts have split on the issue of whether the use of a
copyrighted work in a political campaign is commercial for purposes of
the fair use analysis. In Keep Thomson Governor Committee v.
Citizens for Gallen Committee,183 the United States District Court for
the District of New Hampshire considered whether the Defendant’s
campaign advertisement, which incorporated fifteen seconds of
Plaintiff’s song, constituted copyright infringement.184 The Defendant
asserted that its use constituted fair use.185 Regarding the character
174.
Id.
175.
See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 19782005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 561–64 (2008).
176.
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994). For a full explication of
how fair use came to be understood as an affirmative defense in American law, see Ned Snow,
The Forgotten Right of Fair Use, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 135, 159–60 (2011).
177.
See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
178.
See id. at 549.
179.
See, e.g., DC Comics Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982 ) (“The
four factors listed in Section 107 raise essentially factual issues and, as the district court
correctly noted, are normally questions for the jury.”); see also Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061,
1069 (2d Cir. 1977). But see Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir.
2003) (“Where material facts are not in dispute, fair use is appropriately decided on summary
judgment.” (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 560)).
180.
See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 562.
181.
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587–88.
182.
Id. at 584 (“[T]he mere fact that a use is educational and not for profit does not
insulate it from a finding of infringement . . . .”).
183.
457 F. Supp. 957 (D.N.H. 1978).
184.
Id.
185.
See id. at 960.
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of the use, the Court stated, “The use by the defendant . . . is clearly
part of a political campaign message, noncommercial in nature . . . .”186
Nearly thirty years later, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York also concluded that the use of
copyrighted content in the context of a political advertisement was not
commercial.187 More recently, the United States District Court for the
Central District of California came to the opposite conclusion.188 In
Henley v. Devore,189 the court considered whether the use of two
copyrighted songs in political advertisements constituted fair use.190
The court acknowledged the prior precedent but explained that, “in
the Ninth Circuit ‘monetary gain is not the sole criterion[,]
particularly in a setting where profit is ill-measured in dollars.’”191
The court went on to say that the defendants “stood to gain publicity
and campaign donations from their use of” the copyrighted songs;192
therefore, the use was commercial.193
A use is transformative if it serves a purpose different from the
copyrighted work.194 In this sense, this factor overlaps with the effect
on the market of the work because a transformative work will not act
as a market substitute for the copyrighted work.195 The classic case of
a transformative use is a parody using a copyrighted work as the basis
for the creation of a new work.196 In Campbell v. Acuff Rose,197 the
Supreme Court held that a parody of Roy Orbison’s song “Oh, Pretty
Woman” was a fair use.198 In Campbell, the Court defined a parody as
“the use of some elements of a prior author’s composition to create a
new one that, at least in part, comments on that author’s works.”199
The Court assumed that the goal of any parody is to amuse its
audience,200 even if the joke might not be to the Court’s taste.201
186.
Id. at 961.
187.
See Mastercard Int’l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., No. 00 Civ.6068 (GBD),
2004 WL 434404, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004).
188.
See Henley v. DeVore, 733 F.Supp. 2d 1144, 1159 (C.D. Cal 2010).
189.
733 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
190.
See id. at 1150.
191.
Id. at 1159 (alterations in original) (quoting Worldwide Church of God v. Phila.
Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000)).
192.
Id.
193.
See id.
194.
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
195.
See id.
196.
See id.
197.
Id.
198.
See id. at 572.
199.
Id. at 580 (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986); MCA, Inc. v.
Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981)).
200.
See id. at 597.
201.
See id. at 582.
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The Romney ad is obviously not a parody.
First, the
advertisement does not comment upon the NBC broadcast. Rather, it
comments on the subject of that broadcast—Newt Gingrich.
Moreover, the advertisement consists solely of the snippet in question,
adding no new content. Its goal is not humor. Although the Supreme
Court has cautioned against declining to find fair use just because the
court does not get the joke, it seems clear on its face that there is no
joke intended here.
Since Campbell, a number of lower courts have found
transformative uses outside of the context of parody. In both Kelly v.
Arriba Soft Corp.202 and Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,203 the
Ninth Circuit held that the alleged infringer engaged in
transformative use when it provided thumbnails of the copyright
owner’s images in its search engine results.204 In Núñez v. Caribbean
International News Corp.,205 the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit held that a newspaper’s use of a photograph of a
model originally taken as a part of her portfolio was a transformative
use because that use did not interfere with the market for the
photograph as a portion of a fashion portfolio.206 Similarly, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that the use of
concert posters in a book detailing the history of a band was a
transformative fair use.207
If NBC’s purpose is articulated broadly (e.g., providing
information to the polity), there is a colorable argument that Romney’s
use would fall within this ambit. While NBC’s motivation behind
providing the information about Gingrich’s ethics dilemmas might be
completely different from Romney’s, there is a way in which the
asserted purposes may overlap. To find otherwise, a court would have
to consider and credit Romney’s political motivations.
Framed within the context of Romney’s campaign for office, it
seems clear that Romney’s advertisement serves a purpose quite
different from NBC’s purpose in producing the original, underlying
content. While NBC’s purpose in publishing the broadcast was the
contemporaneous dissemination of newsworthy facts, Romney’s is the
dissemination of a political message designed to aid his quest to obtain
the Republican nomination for the Presidency. While asserting the
precise nature of that political message requires some speculation,
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
2006).

336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
See Perfect 10, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1165; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 819.
235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000).
See id. at 25.
See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609–12 (2d Cir.
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there is no question that Romney’s purpose was not the
contemporaneous dissemination of newsworthy facts. As an initial
matter, the events underlying the broadcast took place some fifteen
years prior to the Romney advertisement.208 As such, the purpose of
Romney’s use is distinct from that of NBC’s initial production of the
broadcast.209
To the extent that a court hearing a copyright infringement
suit will consider the First Amendment as a limit upon copyright, it
will generally do so based on the nature of the alleged infringer’s
use.210 A number of courts have held that a use involving content that
is of great public concern weighs in favor of the alleged infringer.211
Moreover, courts have held that where a case implicates the First
Amendment, the fair use doctrine is to be given a wider reading.212
However, no court has ever held that the use of copyrighted content in
a campaign advertisement is fair use as a matter of law. In fact, in
Browne v. McCain,213 the McCain presidential campaign filed a motion
to dismiss, asserting that use of the song “Running on Empty” in its
advertisement constituted fair use as a matter of law.214 The Central
District of California denied the motion explaining,
[The Republican National Committee] has not established that Plaintiff’s claim is
barred, as a matter of law, under the fair use doctrine. The mere fact that Plaintiff’s
claim is based on Defendants’ use of his copyrighted work in a political campaign does
not bar Plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.215

208.
See Jack Mirkinson, NBC Demands Mitt Romney Take Down Ad That Uses Tom
Brokaw Footage, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 28, 2012, 1:14 PM, updated Jan. 28, 2012, 4:50
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/28/nbc-mitt-romney-tom-brokaw-ad_n_1239107.
html.
209.
See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
210.
See, e.g., Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Handgun Control Fed’n of Ohio, 15 F.3d 559, 562
(6th Cir. 1994) (“This contrast with commercial activity helps show that the purpose and
character of HCF’s use is far removed from that which the copyright law centrally protects and
instead falls within the realm of the designated fair use purposes. The document was used
primarily in exercising HCF’s First Amendment speech rights to comment on public issues and
to petition the government regarding legislation.”).
211.
See id. (“The scope of the fair use doctrine is wider when the use relates to issues of
public concern.” (citing Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1040
(2d Cir. 1983))); see also Hustler Magazine v. Moral Majority, 606 F. Supp. 1526, 1526–36 (C.D.
Cal. 1985).
212.
See, e.g., Wojnarowicz v. Am. Family Ass’n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 146–47 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
213.
612 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
214.
See id. at 1129–30.
215.
Id. at 1130.
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The McCain campaign ultimately settled the litigation.216
Likewise, in Long v. Ballantine,217 the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina denied an alleged infringer’s
motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of fair use where
the defendant used plaintiff’s photograph in the context of a campaign
advertisement.218 The Long court specifically held that fair use is
determined on a case-by-case basis, and, therefore, the determination
of this issue at trial was dispositive.219 The Long decision also
highlights an additional risk an alleged infringer in a copyright
infringement suit faces—the award of attorney’s fees and costs.220
Even though the jury only awarded damages of $500,221 the plaintiff
was able to recover over $70,000 in attorney’s fees and costs.222 Such
decisions give any potential copyright defendant pause.
In the absence of a more robust consideration of the First
Amendment interests at stake, a court would likely find that the use
of NBC’s copyrighted footage by the Romney campaign is a
commercial use. The question of transformativeness, however, is a
mixed bag given the mere copying without parody (weighing in favor
of NBC) but the arguably different purpose from the original use
(weighing in favor of the Romney campaign). Ultimately, the “purpose
and character of use” likely weighs slightly in favor of NBC or is
neutral.
2. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
Courts have held that the nature of the copyrighted work is of
the least import in the fair use analysis.223 When considering this
factor, courts ask whether the copyrighted work is the type of work
that is at the heart of copyright protection, such as a fictional or
artistic work.224 In explaining this factor the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has said,

216.
See May Ann Akers, Jackson Browne Defeats John McCain, THE WASHINGTON POST
(July 21, 2009, 3:06 PM, updated July 22, 2009, 9:35 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/
sleuth/2009/07/john_mccain_really_running_on.html.
217.
No. 7:96-CV-210-BR, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7813 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 25, 1998).
218.
See id. at *2, *16–18.
219.
See id. at *17.
220.
See id. at *3.
221.
See id. at *2–3.
222.
See id. at *11–14.
223.
See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1402
(9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]his factor typically has not been terribly significant in the overall fair use
balancing . . . .”).
224.
See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 629 (9th Cir. 2003).
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[W]orks such as original songs, motion pictures, and photographs taken for aesthetic
purposes, are creative in nature and thus fit squarely within the core of copyright
protection. . . . But works such as news broadcasts and news video footage are more
factual in nature and thus are more conducive to fair use.225

Therefore, where the work in question is fact-based, this factor is
likely to favor the party asserting the fair use defense.
While the work at issue here is copyrightable,226 the breadth of
copyright protection for news is necessarily limited by the
uncopyrightable nature of the facts reported.227
Therefore, the
copyrighted content in question here is likely not at the heart of
copyright protection. This factor will likely weigh in favor of the
Romney campaign.
3. The Amount and Substantiality Taken
To decide whether this factor weighs in favor of the copyright
owner or the alleged infringer, courts undertake both a qualitative
and a quantitative analysis.228 They consider both the proportion of
the work taken relative to the totality of the work and whether the
alleged infringer took what constitutes the heart of the work, such
that the infringed content acts as a market substitute for the
copyrighted work.229 In that sense, the third and fourth factors inform
each other.230 While there have been cases where the complete
reproduction of a work constituted fair use,231 there is no definitive
quantitative amount of content that will not potentially result in
225.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2002); L.A.
News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 1997)).
226.
See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text.
227.
See discussion supra Part IV.A; see also Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Handgun Control
Fed’n of Ohio, 15 F.3d 559, 562 (6th Cir. 1994) (“The list in the NRA newsletter is almost entirely
factual, and ‘[t]he law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than
works of fiction or fantasy.’” (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 563 (1985))).
228.
See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 564–66.
229.
See id.
230.
See Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1236 (N.D. Ga. 2012)
(“[I]f a professor used an excerpt representing 10% of the copyrighted work, and this was
repeated by others many times, would it cause substantial damage to the potential market for
the copyrighted work? The answer is no, because the 10% excerpt would not substitute for the
original, no matter how many copies were made. In short, Defendants’ use of small excerpts did
not affect Plaintiffs’ actual or potential sales of books.”).
231.
See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 615 (2d
Cir. 2006) (finding that use of concert posters in their entirety constituted fair use); Núñez v.
Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding fair use where a newspaper
reproduced photographs in their entirety). Note that both of these cases involved the use of
photographs, which are difficult to reference without reproducing the entirety.
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infringement liability.232 Notably, fair use cases rarely turn upon the
quantitative measure of the allegedly infringed content.233
Here, the Romney campaign could argue that it only used
thirty seconds of a much longer broadcast.234 Of course, as noted in
the above infringement analysis, there is no bright line rule as to what
portion of a work may be used without infringing. To properly
consider the qualitative aspect of this element, we must know more
about the underlying broadcast. For example, if the snippet used by
the campaign was the night’s lead story, the portion used could
arguably constitute the heart of the broadcast. A court arriving at
such a conclusion is likely to hold that this factor favors NBC. While
it is hard to say whether this factor would favor Romney or NBC, it is
pretty clear that the factual record would have to be developed on this
point. The same is true of the fourth factor.
4. The Effect on the Market for the Work
In evaluating this factor, courts consider not only the direct
effect of the alleged infringer’s conduct, but also whether similar
conduct by others left unchecked would harm the market for the
work.235 A court might inquire as to whether there is a market to
license the content, particularly when it represents only a small
portion of the overall work.236 At bottom, if there is a market to
license the content, courts tend to find that unauthorized uses harm
that market.237
Any court hearing a dispute between Romney and NBC and
considering a fair use defense will be interested in whether NBC
licenses snippets such as the one in question here. If it does—and
particularly if it does regularly and at a reasonable rate—the court is
likely to find that uses like Romney’s, if unchecked, will harm the
market for those licenses.
5. Fair Use: Conclusion
While it is difficult to predict precisely what a court considering
the fictional case of NBC v. Romney would decide as to the fair use
question, there are some issues that can be resolved definitively and
others that ought to give us pause. First, because fair use is
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

See supra notes 168–170 and accompanying text.
But see Cambridge Univ. Press, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1236–37.
See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).
See, e.g., Cambridge Univ. Press, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1236–37.
See id.
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determined on a case-by-case basis and because the facts presented by
a dispute between Romney and NBC do not necessitate a finding one
way or the other, it is clear that a defendant pursuing such litigation
undertakes a significant risk. This is particularly true in light of the
potential for the award of statutory damages and attorney’s fees.238 In
addition, it is clear that deciding whether the campaign’s conduct
constitutes fair use requires some development of the factual record.
This means that a court is unlikely to resolve this dispute until at
least the summary judgment stage. Again, a defendant undertaking
such litigation would have to consider the expense associated with
litigating a copyright infringement suit through summary judgment,
irrespective of the merits. Others have considered the chilling effect
associated with the nature of the fair use determination.239 The
analysis undertaken here demonstrates that effect.
The idea-expression dichotomy is unlikely to assist our fictional
defendant; technical infringement is clear, and a finding of fair use is
far from a foregone conclusion. On the other hand, First Amendment
jurisprudence cautions that political speech requires the greatest
protection, and the Copyright Act, as applied in this context, is
arguably unconstitutionally vague.240 Approaching this question from
the perspective of the Copyright Act would allow content owners to do
what candidates themselves could not do without implicating the First
Amendment; that is, suppress speech that is relevant to a candidate’s
qualifications for office.
This divergence in potential outcomes
depends solely upon whether one approaches the question from the
perspective of the Copyright Act or the First Amendment. This
demonstrates that the internal safeguards, as ordinarily utilized, do
not fully protect the free speech interests at stake when copyright
holders allege infringement in the context of a political campaign.
What follows is an attempt to imbue fair use with the ability to protect
free speech in this context. Doing so will require courts to presume
fair use when the alleged infringement occurs in the context of a
political campaign.
V. AN ATTEMPT AT HARMONIZATION: REALIZING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT POTENTIAL OF TRANSFORMATIVENESS
In order for the fair use doctrine to protect the free speech
interests at stake in a case like the fictional dispute between NBC and
238.
See supra notes 220–222 and accompanying text.
239.
See, e.g., Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, supra
note 34, at 20–23.
240.
See discussion supra Part II.
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Romney, both procedural and substantive problems must be
addressed. On the procedural side, the hesitation of courts to
summarily adjudicate the issue of fair use presents a significant
hurdle.241 It is untenable for a political campaign to litigate a
copyright infringement suit in the absence of some reasonable
expectation that the matter can be resolved with little fact-finding. A
rebuttable presumption of fair use in this context would address this
issue, recognizing that lengthy adjudications around issues of
protected political speech during the heat of a campaign are anathema
to the protection provided by the First Amendment.242
On the substantive side, the Supreme Court has already
provided a rhetorical approach that could prove useful in this context:
tranformativeness. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose the Court developed the
concept of tranformativeness to explain parody as fair use.243 As noted
above, lower courts employ this analysis in cases that have nothing to
do with parody.244 Utilizing that concept to evaluate fair use in
political campaigns makes even more sense because transformative
use as articulated in Campbell is protective of First Amendment
interests.245
Specifically, courts treat parodies as potentially
important social commentary.246 Political speech—speech undertaken
by a candidate for political office in furtherance of his
candidacy—deserves at least as much breathing room as parody.
Therefore, the suggestion here is that courts considering allegations of
copyright infringement in the context of political campaigns recognize
the First Amendment interests at stake by expanding the notion of
tranformativeness to encompass such uses.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article questions the decisions holding that the fair use
defense and idea-expression dichotomy, as currently implemented, are
sufficient to address the First Amendment issues that can arise in the
context of copyright infringement suits. It asserts that there are
instances, such as when the alleged infringement occurs in the context
241.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
242.
See supra notes 28–54 and accompanying text.
243.
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579–82 (1994).
244.
See supra notes 202–207 and accompanying text.
245.
See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1400
(9th Cir. Cal. 1997) (“[T]he inquiry is whether . . . and to what extent the new work is
‘transformative,’ i.e., altering [the copyrighted work] with new expression, meaning or message.
Parody is regarded as a form of social and literary criticism, having a socially significant value as
free speech under the First Amendment.”); see generally Mel Marquis, Fair Use of the First
Amendment: Parody and Its Protections, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 123 (1997).
246.
See id.
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of a political campaign, in which the First Amendment is squarely
implicated and the internal safeguards are insufficient. In order to
demonstrate this, this Article has undertaken a thought experiment
approaching NBC’s efforts to stop the Romney campaign from using a
portion of an old television news broadcast in an advertisement from
the perspective of the First Amendment and, in the alternative, from
the perspective of recent copyright jurisprudence. Undertaking these
analyses side-by-side shows that there are circumstances in which the
internal safeguards, as currently deployed, are plainly inadequate. In
such circumstances, courts ought to either explicitly consider the First
Amendment as a defense or fortify the fair use analysis by reference to
First Amendment principles.

